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Highlights
• Ownership can be viewed as a cooperative arrangement where individuals inhibit
their tendency to take other’s property
• Dyads of captive apes and human children could access the same food resources
• Human children, but not apes, respected their partner’s claims
• This highlights the uniquely cooperative nature of human ownership arrangements
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Abstract
Access to and control of resources is a major source of costly conflicts. Animals, under
some conditions, respect what others control and use (i.e., possession). Humans not
only respect possession of resources, they also respect ownership. Ownership can be
viewed as a cooperative arrangement, where individuals inhibit their tendency to take
others’ property on the condition that those others will do the same. We investigated to
what degree great apes follow this principle, as compared to human children. We
conducted two experiments, in which dyads of individuals could access the same food
resources. The main test of respect for ownership was whether individuals would refrain
from taking their partner’s resources even when the partner could not immediately
access and control them. Captive apes (N = 14 dyads) failed to respect their partner’s
claim on food resources and frequently monopolized the resources when given the
opportunity. Human children (N = 14 dyads), tested with a similar apparatus and
procedure, respected their partner’s claim and made spontaneous verbal references to
ownership. Such respect for the property of others highlights the uniquely cooperative
nature of human ownership arrangements.
Keywords: conflict, cooperation, ownership, social behaviour, apes, children
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Children, but not great apes, respect ownership
Ownership can be described as a relation between individuals with regard to an
object and some have argued that ownership relations are based on cooperative
arrangements that specify owners’ rights and duties (Christman, 1994; Hume,
1739/2000; Rose, 1985; Singer, Berger, Davidson, & Penalver, 2017). In other words,
ownership is viewed as a set of mutually recognized and respected norms regulating how
people relate to objects (Kalish & Anderson, 2011; Snare, 1972). For instance,
individuals will inhibit their tendency to take away others’ property on the condition
that others will do the same. Importantly, ownership in this view is distinct from
possession as it does not (necessarily) rely on physical contact or close proximity to an
object. An owner can thus trust others to respect her property even when she does not
currently possess it or when she is absent.
In humans, understanding of ownership emerges early in ontogeny: Toddlers
already infer ownership of their own objects as well as ownership of present and absent
owners (Fasig, 2000; Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012; Brownell, Iesue, Nichols, &
Svetlova, 2013). They also verbally claim ownership of and win fights over their own
toys irrespective of current possession (Ross, 1996; Ross, Conant, & Vickar, 2011; Ross,
2013; Ross, Friedman, & Field, 2015). Preschoolers prioritize statements of verbal
ownership over physical possession (Blake, Ganea, & Harris, 2012) and give priority to
owners in conflicts about the use of objects (Neary & Friedman, 2014). Furthermore,
preschoolers signal ownership of objects to absent others, respect what belongs to
absent owners, and actively enforce their own and other’s ownership claims (Rossano,
Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011; Kanngiesser & Hood, 2014; Rossano, Fiedler, &
Tomasello, 2015). Taken together, this evidence shows that young children have a
notion of ownership as distinct from possession or current use.
There is some indication that respect for ownership claims overrides young
children’s tendencies to accumulate resources. When given windfall resources to share
with others, young children usually give away little and keep the biggest share to
themselves (Rochat et al., 2009; Cowell et al., 2017; for reviews, see: Gummerum,
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Hanoch, & Keller, 2008; Ibbotson, 2014; McAuliffe, Blake, Steinbeis, & Warneken, 2017;
Blake, 2018). However, toddlers share more resources with peers if there are cues to
ownership such as colours and spatial arrangements (Ulber, Hamann, & Tomasello,
2015). Preschoolers also share equally after they have acquired resources collaboratively
(Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011; for a review see: Warneken, 2018) - likely
because they view the resources as jointly owned. In addition, preschoolers share toys
more frequently if they are told that the toys belong to the class (Eisenberg-Berg,
Haake, Hand, & Sadalla, 1979). While children view their ownership claims on their
own resources as categorical, their respect for others’ ownership claims varies with the
strength of those claims (i.e., whether resources were found or made; Davoodi, Nelson,
& Blake, 2018).
It has been suggested that humans and animals share a sense of ownership
(Sherratt & Mesterton-Gibbons, 2015; Stake, 2004; Gintis, 2007). Many animals occupy
territories or take possession of resources, and access to and control of resources is a
major source of costly conflicts. It has been observed for many taxa that first possessors
of resources often defeat intruders (Kokko, López-Sepulcre, & Morrell, 2006) and, in
some instances, even remain unchallenged (Sigg & Falett, 1985; Kummer & Cords,
1991). Respect for first possession can prevent protracted and escalated conflicts (Smith
& Price, 1973), though the precise mechanisms underlying it are debated (Grafen, 1987;
Kokko et al., 2006; Sherratt & Mesterton-Gibbons, 2015). One key factor appears to be
an individual’s constant use or physical control of the contested resources (Kummer,
1991; Tibble & Carvalho, 2018).
Apes show some possession-related behaviours (Kummer, 1991; Brosnan, 2011).
For example, chimpanzees occupy territories that they regularly patrol and defend
against intruders (Mitani, Watts, & Muller, 2002), and great apes value food they
currently possess (Brosnan et al., 2007; Kanngiesser, Santos, Hood, & Call, 2011).
There is, to date, no experimental evidence on respect for possession in apes and only
scarce evidence from other primates: dominant male baboons respect sub-dominant
males’ possession of food (but respect did not occur in other sex-pairings; Sigg & Falett,
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1985); dominant long-tail macaques respect sub-dominants’ possession of movable food
containers (but not of stationary ones; Kummer & Cords, 1991), and rhesus macaques
prefer a food option that is not physically attached to or near a human experimenter
(Russ, Comins, Smith, & Hauser, 2010).
All the behaviours described in the previous paragraph relate to physical
possession and there is to date no conclusive empirical evidence to support the claim
that primates also have a notion of ownership (Sherratt & Mesterton-Gibbons, 2015;
Stake, 2004; Gintis, 2007). For example, previous studies (Sigg & Falett, 1985; Kummer
& Cords, 1991) allowed for physical control of the contested resource as well as for
physical interaction between individuals. It is thus unclear whether the observed
respect for possession occurred due to respect of the other’s claim, due to fear of
immediate retaliation and risk of injury (Sigg & Falett, 1985) or because the possessor
simply had the opportunity to escape with the resource (Kummer & Cords, 1991).
We therefore conducted a study with bonobos and chimpanzees (henceforth apes),
in which we prevented (i) physical contact with the resource and (ii) physical
interactions between individuals. Dyads of individuals were tested in separate testing
rooms and had access to an apparatus (placed between the two rooms), where they
could harvest food items. We attempted to establish a sense of ownership through the
investment of work effort into harvesting items (Kanngiesser, Gjersoe, & Hood, 2010;
Kanngiesser & Hood, 2014; Rochat et al., 2014). Each individual worked for two items
by pushing the items along transparent tubes to drop them onto trays. To facilitate
tracking of the items, the two items were wrapped in the same colour (with distinct
colours on each side of the apparatus). Both individuals then had access to the same
food items and could retrieve them by pulling the trays to their side. In the
simultaneous condition, we gave both individuals immediate access to the rewards. In
delayed condition, we gave one individual immediate access to the rewards, while the
other individual had to wait for 45 seconds. The delayed condition was the main test of
respect for ownership, as it gave individuals with prior access the opportunity to
maximize their own outcome by disrespecting their partner’s claim and retrieving all
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four items. For comparison, we tested human four-year-olds with a similar apparatus
and procedure (Study 2). We selected this age group to ensure that children could
operate the apparatus easily and with little training. Moreover, four-year-olds are able
to use visual markers to track ownership (Gelman, Manczak, Was, & Noles, 2016) and
consider owned objects as non-fungible (McEwan, Pesowski, & Friedman, 2016).
Study 1 - Apes
Methods
Subjects. Eight chimpanzees (pan troglodytes) and seven bonobos (pan
paniscus) participated in the study (for details, see Supplementary Information, Table
S1). Three chimpanzees came from a group of eight individuals (B group) and five
chimpanzees from a group of 17 individuals (A group); all bonobos came from the same
group of ten individuals (C group). In the main test, apes were paired with individuals
from the same social group. All apes, except one bonobo, participated twice in the
study - each time with a different partner. This resulted in a total of 14 dyads (eight
chimpanzee dyads, six bonobo dyads; see Supplementary Information, Table S1, for
more information). Individuals were always paired with a partner that differed in social
rank (for details, see dominance measure below). Fifteen additional chimpanzees
started the training for this study, but were excluded because they were unwilling to
participate (12 individuals) or did not pass the training (three individuals). The final
sample size was thus determined (i) by the number of apes available at the zoo and (ii)
by the number of apes who passed the initial training.
The apes were housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center
(WKPRC) at the zoo of Leipzig, where they had access to semi-natural indoor and
outdoor enclosures and received regular enrichment. They were fed a variety of fruits
and vegetables, occasionally supplemented by animal protein (meat, eggs, and yoghurt).
Apes had access to water ad libitum and were never food deprived. All apes
participated in a variety of studies on a daily basis. Testing took place in the apes’
sleeping rooms between 8:30 and 12:30 and participation was entirely voluntarily.
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The study was non-invasive and strictly adhered to the legal requirements in
Germany. No medical, toxicological or neurobiological research of any kind is conducted
at the WKPRC. The study was ethically approved by an internal committee at the
WKPRC (committee members: Prof. M. Tomasello, Dr. J. Call, Dr. D. Hanus,
veterinarian Dr. A. Bernhard, head keeper F. Schellhardt, and assistant head keeper M.
Lohse). Animal husbandry and research comply with the “EAZA Minimum Standards
for the Accommodation and Care of Animals in Zoos and Aquaria”, the "WAZA Ethical
Guidelines for the Conduct of Research on Animals by Zoos and Aquariums" and the
"Guidelines for the Treatment of Animals in Behavioral Research and Teaching" of the
Association for the Study of Animal Behavior (ASAB). Approval by an Institutional
Review Board (IRB) was not necessary as, according to German law (TierSchGes §7
and §8), the use of animals in purely behavioural or observational studies requires no
special permission.
Apparatus and materials. Apes harvested food rewards by pushing them
along a transparent tube until they dropped on a sliding tray (see Figure 1). They
could then retrieve the rewards by opening a door and pulling on a string connected to
the tray. All tubes were transparent and rewards always moved in straight lines to allow
apes to easily track them (for a detailed description of the apparatus, see
Supplementary Information, section 1.2).
We used half a food pellet as reward and wrapped each reward in packing paper.
The packing paper made it more effortful for the apes to push the reward along the
tube, and allowed us to wrap the rewards in different colours (without having to dye the
actual food). In the test sessions, one individual in a dyad always harvested rewards
wrapped in blue paper, the other individual always harvested rewards wrapped in red
paper. The different colours were introduced to help individuals track their rewards.
Design. Apes first participated in individual training sessions to familiarize
them with the apparatus (for details on the training procedure, see Supplementary
Information, section 1.3). Only apes that successfully completed the apparatus training
participated in the test sessions where they were paired with another individual from
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the same social group.
We tested ape dyads in two conditions in a within-subject design. In the
simultaneous condition, both individuals could simultaneously access the rewards on the
sliding trays. In the delayed condition, one ape had immediate access to the rewards,
while the other was blocked for 45 seconds. Each dyad took part in four test sessions of
four trials each. The order of test sessions followed an A-B-B-A design: simultaneous
session, delayed session, delayed session, simultaneous session. The simultaneous
condition always took place in session 1 to give apes experience with the dyadic test
situation (i.e., that the other individual harvested rewards and could access the trays,
too). We decided to do this as part of the main test to avoid conducting training
sessions with social partners (human or con-specific).
Procedure. The study was conducted by two experimenters who baited the
apparatus, passed the poking sticks to the apes, removed the barriers from the doors
and reset the apparatus after each trial. During test trials the experimenters always
turned their backs to the apes once they had removed the barrier (to avoid cueing apes).
In the test phase, apes were paired with an individual from the same social group.
Each individual in a dyad was assigned to one of the testing rooms (room 1 or 2) and
stayed in the same room during all test sessions of this dyad. In addition, each ape was
assigned one reward colour (red or blue). Importantly, the hydraulic door between the
two room was closed to prevent apes from directly interacting with each other.
In the simultaneous condition, we baited two tubes in each room (e.g., tubes 1 &
3 in room 1, and tubes 2 & 4 in room 2, order counterbalanced across trials), so that all
four tubes were baited. Once both apes had pushed the rewards onto the trays, the grey
barriers on each side of the apparatus were simultaneously removed by E1 and E2 so
that both apes had simultaneous access to the trays.
In the delayed condition, the set up was the same except that we used one gray
and one yellow barrier. The individual on the side with the yellow barrier was blocked
from accessing the trays for 45 seconds, while the individual on the side with the gray
barrier had immediate access to the trays. We alternated the side of the yellow barrier
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between trials, so that each ape was blocked on two of the four trials per session. We
counterbalanced across delayed sessions which ape was blocked first.
Dominance measure. To obtain a dominance measure, we presented keepers
with all dyad combinations for each ape-group and asked them to indicate (yes/no) the
dominant individual in each dyad. We received ratings from four keepers of the
chimpanzee A group, from three keepers of the chimpanzee B group and from three
keepers of the bonobo group. We used the ratings to select dyads for the study, in
which one individual was rated as dominant by all (or the majority of) keepers.
Data coding. We recorded all training and test sessions with two cameras that
were focused on the right and the left side of the apparatus, respectively. Apes’
performance during training and test sessions was live-coded by the third author (R. F.)
and confirmed from video-recordings. For the test sessions, we coded which sliding trays
apes pulled to their side. 28 trials (18 chimpanzee trials, 10 bonobo trials; 13% of all
trials) had to be repeated because of apparatus failure or experimenter error. One
bonobo dyad (B3) did not complete the last test session (simultaneous condition)
because one individual refused to participate. For reliability purposes, a second coder
re-coded the test sessions (valid trials only) of four dyads (two bonobo and two
chimpanzee dyads; 29% of dyads). Agreement between coders was perfect (Cohen’s κ =
1).
Data analyses. All data analyses were conducted in R Version 3.4.1. (for
details, see Supplementary Information). We analyzed the data using Generalized
Linear Mixed Models with a binomial error distribution. In the GLMM, we entered the
response variable as a matrix of the number of the owner’s items that were retrieved by
the owner (left column; range = 0 - 2) and by the non-owner (right column; range = 0 -
2), respectively. The matrix variable represents the proportion of the owner’s items that
were correctly retrieved by the owner while considering the discontinuous nature of the
response variable (see Baayen, 2008, p. 197). The model estimates have the exact same
interpretation as in any other logistic model. We entered as fixed effects: condition,
species, and their two-way interaction. We entered as control predictors: session
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number, trial number, dominance of the owner, and sex of the owner. We also included
random intercepts and random slopes (for details, see Supplementary Information,
section 1.4). We conducted model comparisons to determine the model with the best fit
to the data and determined the p-values for each fixed effect by conducting likelihood
ratio tests (for details, see Supplementary Information, section 1.4).
We further used GLMM analyses (of the reduced model) to test for each species
whether the proportion of own items retrieved by owners differed from chance. We
made use of the fact that the model estimate for the intercept and the associated
p-value indicate whether the proportion of own items is significantly different from
chance levels. The intercept reveals the expected mean of the response variable for each
reference level of the factor, in this case species, and all other predictors being zero.
However, due to the nature of logistic models, there might be a small difference between
the sample mean assumed by the model and the actual sample mean, for which we
adjusted (for details, see Supplementary Information, section 1.4).
Results and discussion
Comparison of the full model to a null model (without condition and species and
their two-way interaction) showed a trend for improvement in model fit for the more
complex model, χ2(3) = 6.914, p = 0.075. Likelihood ratio tests revealed that none of
the fixed effects in the full model reach significance at the 0.05 level (for details, see
Supplementary Information, Table S2). Next, we fitted a reduced model with the main
effects of condition and species (and without their two-way interaction). Comparison of
the full model to the reduced model revealed no significant improvement in model fit for
the more complex model, χ2(1) = 2.215, p = 0.137. The reduced model revealed a
significant effect of species, χ2(1) = 4.614, p = 0.032; no other predictors were
significant (for details, see Table 1).
Figure 2 provides details on the proportion of own items retrieved by bonobos and
chimpanzees. In the simultaneous condition, bonobos retrieved an average proportion of
M = 0.42 (SD = 0.15) own items and chimpanzees of M = 0.54 (SD = 0.08) own
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items. In the delayed condition, bonobos retrieved an average proportion of M = 0.49
(SD = 0.04) own items and chimpanzees of M = 0.50 (SD = 0.03) own items (see
Supplementary Information, Table S3 and S4, for further details). We used GLMM
analyses (of the reduced model) to test for each species whether the proportion of own
items retrieved by owners differed from chance. Intercepts revealed that apes failed to
retrieve their own items at levels that differed significantly from chance (bonobos: Est
= -0.185, SE = 0.211, Z = -0.879, p = 0.380; chimpanzees: Est = 0.086, SE = 0.164, Z
= 0.525, p = 0.600). This shows that, in both conditions, apes were as likely to retrieve
their partner’s items as they were to retrieve their own.
In the delayed condition, individuals with prior access retrieved all of the available
food in the majority of trials (bonobos: 85% of trials; chimpanzees: 95% of trials; see
Fig. 3), maximizing their own outcome. In the simultaneous condition, the distribution
of food within dyads was either equal (bonobos: 70% of trials; chimpanzees: 39% of
trials) or unequal (bonobos: 30% of trials; chimpanzees: 53% of trials).
In summary, we found that neither bonobos nor chimpanzees retrieved their own
items at levels that differed significantly from chance. Moreover, when given the
opportunity to monopolize food in the delayed condition, individuals from both species
took all available food on the vast majority of trials. We found a significant species
difference, which seems to be driven primarily by two bonobo dyads who, in the
simultaneous condition, often retrieved their partner’s items instead of their own.
Individuals in these two dyads had one of the largest age differences (9 and 11 years,
respectively) in the ape sample and it is possible that this influenced their food
retrieval. Furthermore, bonobos achieved an equal reward division more often than
chimpanzees (70% vs. 39%) in the simultaneous condition. Some studies have found
that chimpanzees monopolize food more frequently than bonobos in feeding contexts
(Hare, Melis, Woods, Hastings, & Wrangham, 2007; Wobber, Wrangham, & Hare, 2010)
- though, there is an ongoing debate about whether such findings reflect species
differences in sociality (see e.g., Jaeggi, Stevens, & van Schaik, 2010, for a discussion).
We used food items in our study for the most stringent test of respect for ownership as
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apes are usually strongly motivated by food. Studies have shown that apes behave
differently towards food and non-food items (such as toys or tools) in their possession:
they are reluctant to give up food for food of similar value, but frequently trade
non-food items (Brosnan et al., 2007; Kanngiesser et al., 2011) - unless they can be
directly used to acquire food (Brosnan, Jones, Gardner, Lambeth, & Schapiro, 2012).
Regarding our study set-up, we predict that apes would take non-food items
indiscriminately of who had initially harvested them.
Study 2 - Human children
In Study 2, we tested four-year-old human children with an apparatus and
procedure similar to Study 1. We did not use ownership labels during testing to avoid
establishing ownership verbally.
Methods
Participants. 28 four-year-old children (Mean age = 4 years 7 months, SD = 4
months, Range = 48 - 60 months; 14 female) took part in the study. Children were
paired in same-gender dyads (14 dyads in total). Since the ape study was conducted
first, the sample size of this study was chosen to match the sample size of Study 1.
Seven additional children were trained on the apparatus but did not participate in the
study because they were absent on the testing day(s). Children were recruited from a
database of parents who had signed up their children as participants in developmental
studies. Testing took place in children’s kindergarten (six kindergartens in total).
Children came mostly from middle-class families and lived in a city in Eastern Germany
with more than half a million inhabitants.
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and the
ethical guidelines of the German Psychological Society (DGPs) and the Association of
German Professional Psychologists (BDP). The study did not involve any invasive
techniques, ethically problematic procedures or deception, and, therefore, did not
require approval by an Institutional Review Board (see the regulations on freedom of
research in the German Constitution, § 5 (3)).
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Apparatus and materials. We used an apparatus that was similar to the one
in study 1. Children worked for rewards (gummy bears) by pushing them along a
transparent tube until they dropped on a sliding tray (see Figure 4). They could then
retrieve the rewards by opening a door and pulling on a string connected to the tray.
All tubes were transparent and rewards always moved in straight lines to allow children
to easily track the rewards (for details on the apparatus, see Supplementary
Information, section 2.1).
We used gummy bears as rewards and placed them in small containers. The
containers allowed us to handle the food in a hygienic way, and to mark the containers
in different colours. In the test sessions, one child always had green-dotted containers
on their side, and the other child always had blue-dotted containers on their side to help
them track their rewards.
Design. Children first participated in individual training sessions to familiarize
them with the apparatus (day 1). Then, they participated in test sessions where they
were paired with another child of the same gender. We tested dyads of children in two
conditions in a within-subject design. In the simultaneous condition, both children
could simultaneously access the rewards on the trays. In the delayed condition, one
child had immediate access to the rewards, while the other was blocked for 45 seconds.
Each dyad took part in four test sessions of four trials each. The order of test sessions
followed an A-B-B-A design: simultaneous session, delayed session, delayed session,
simultaneous session. The simultaneous condition always took place in session 1 to give
children experience with the dyadic test situation and to avoid training sessions with a
social partner. We decided to use the same A-B-B-A design as in study 1 to allow for
comparability with the ape data. We conducted two test sessions per day to reduce the
number of testing days for children. On day 2, children took part in one simultaneous
and one delayed session, and on day 3 they took part in one delayed and one
simultaneous session. The training day (day 1) and the two testing days (day 2 and 3)
took place within a four-day window with a maximum of a one-day break between the
training and the first testing day (testing days 2 and 3 always took place on consecutive
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Procedure. The study was conducted by an experimenter (E1) and a helper
(E2). E1 was in the room with the children during trials, passed them the poking sticks
and unblocked the doors. During the test trials, E1 always turned her back to the
children while they pulled on the trays (to avoid cueing children). In between trials, E2
supervised the children outside the room, while E1 prepared the apparatus for the next
trial.
Only children who successfully completed the apparatus training participated in
the study (for details see, Supplementary Information section 2.2). During training, we
used unmarked, yellow containers for the rewards. In the training and test sessions, E1
did not use any possessive pronouns (e.g., deins ’yours’) when talking about the rewards
or the apparatus to avoid verbal priming of ownership.
Dominance measures. Before the test sessions on day 2, children
participated in a dominance test with their peer-partner. The partner was of the
same-gender and came from the same kindergarten group; s/he remained the same for
all test sessions. The two children sat on the floor and E1 placed a box between them
announcing that it contained a surprise-toy (a toy mobile phone). Then E1 went to a
corner of the room and turned away from the children. Children had 1 minute to open
the box and play with the toy. In addition to this behavioural dominance measure, we
asked the children’s kindergarten teachers which child in a given dyad was the dominant
child (teacher ratings are available for all dyads except two).
Test. Children participated in the test with their peer-partner. Each child was
assigned to one side of the apparatus and stayed on that side during all test sessions. In
addition, each child was assigned one reward container colour (green or blue). Children
collected their gummy bear rewards in lunch bags marked with their names.
In the simultaneous condition, we placed rewards in two tubes on each side of the
apparatus (e.g., tubes 1 & 3 on one side, and tubes 2 & 4 on the other side, order
counterbalanced across trials), so that all four tubes contained rewards. At the start,
E1 handed children the sticks and asked them to start. Once children had pushed all
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reward containers onto the trays, E1 collected the sticks, unblocked the doors on both
sides of the apparatus and turned away. Children could then retrieve the rewards by
pulling the trays (if necessary E1 assisted with opening the reward containers at the end
of the trial). Then, children left the room and E1 prepared the apparatus for the next
trial.
In the delayed condition, the set up was the same except that we used the
stop-sign and the hour glass. The child on the side with the stop-signed was blocked
from accessing the trays for 45 seconds, while the child on the other side had immediate
access to the trays. Before the start of the first trial, E1 reminded children that the
doors would be blocked for some time on the side with the stop-sign; E1 also told
children that they were not allowed to switch sides. After the children had pushed the
rewards onto the trays, E1 unblocked the doors on the side without the stop sign,
turned over the hour glass and turned away. After 45 seconds E1 unblocked the doors
on the side with the stop-sign. We alternated the side of the stop-sign between trials, so
that each child was blocked on two of the four trials per session. We counterbalanced
across delayed sessions which child was blocked first.
Data coding.
Reward retrieval. All training and test sessions were videotaped. We scored
from videotape (1) which reward containers children retrieved by pulling the trays to
their respective sides, and (2) the final distribution of reward containers after some
children had exchanged or handed over reward containers. All data was coded by the
fourth author (A.T.). For reliability purposes, a second coder re-scored children’s
behaviour for four dyads (two female dyads and two male dyads; 29% of dyads) from
videotape. Agreement between the two coders for retrieval was perfect (Cohen’s κ = 1)
as was agreement for the final distribution of rewards (Cohen’s κ = 1).
Dominance measure. To determine dominance, coder 1 scored from
videotape which child in a dyad took the toy first (scored as 1); in one dyad no child
took the toy, so we scored which child opened the box first. We also scored which child
in a dyad played the longest with the toy (scored as 1). In addition, kindergarten
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teachers were asked to rate which child in a dyad they viewed as dominant (scored as
1). We combined these three measures to calculate a dominance score (0-3; for two
dyads without teacher rating the score was 0-2). The child with the highest score in a
dyad was rated the dominant child. We opted for this binary dominance measure to
ensure comparability with the binary dominance measure in study 1. For reliability
purposes, coder 2 re-scored children’s dominance behaviour for four dyads (two female
dyads and two male dyads; 29% of dyads) from videotape. There was only moderate
agreement between the coders regarding the dominance scores (Cohen’s weighted κ =
0.684) - mainly because the primary coder had accidentally swapped two children when
coding the play duration. We consequently had a third coder check all dominance
interactions again from videotape. We corrected the dominance scores of five dyads, for
two of which we had to correct the binary dominance measure.
Verbal behaviour. Children’s utterances during the test sessions were first
transcribed verbatim (by coder 3). Next, we categorized children’s utterances in the
retrieval phase, that is, we only consider utterances from the moment E1 unblocked the
doors to the moment both children had retrieved all rewards and started putting them
in their bags. We focused on this phase because it was the most informative in terms of
children’s spontaneous talk about the rewards. Each utterance was scored by a fourth
coder who scored whether children referred to ownership, container-colour,
reward-allocation, fairness or protested (Note that each utterance could be scored in
more than one category):
• Ownership: Children referred to ownership of reward containers and/or
rewards (gummy bears) using possessive pronouns (e.g., meins ’mine’, deins ’yours’) or
other forms of explicitly stating ownership in German (e.g., Das gehört mir ’This
belongs to me’). Utterances referring to ownership of sides (e.g., Das ist auf meiner
Seite ’This is on my side’) were not scored as they do not directly refer to ownership of
the rewards. Utterances including the word haben ’have’ (e.g., Ich hab viele ’I have
many’) were also not scored, as they may only indicate temporary possession and do
not unambiguously refer to ownership.
CHILDREN BUT NOT APES RESPECT OWNERSHIP 18
Examples: Ich nehm meine Blauen! ’I take my blue ones’; Du darfst nicht meine
machen ’You are not allowed to take mine’. Du hast deinen Grünen ’You have your
green one’
• Colour: Children referred to the colour of the blue or green reward container.
Utterances that mentioned colours but did not refer to the reward containers (e.g.,
Grün heißt green in Englisch ’Grün means green in English’; Das ist meine
Lieblingsfarbe ’This is my favourite colour’) or that referred to colours other than green
or blue were not scored.
Examples: Ich hab blau ’I have blue’; Wer auf der Seite ist, hat grün ’The one this side
has green’; Du musst doch den blauen nehmen ’You have to take the blue one’
• Allocation: Children referred to the number or amount of reward containers
or how reward containers were allocated. Utterances with numerals (e.g., zwei ’two’),
amounts (e.g., alles ’all’, viele ’many’, keine ’none’), and statements of allocation (e.g.
zwei für mich, zwei für dich ’two for me, two for you’) were scored.
Examples: Ich hab schon zwei ’I already have two’; Alle sind raus ’all are gone’; Ich hab
so viele ’I have so many’;
• Fairness: Children explicitly referred to fairness, using the words gerecht/fair
’fair’ or ungerecht/unfair ’unfair’.
Example: Sonst ist es unfair ’Otherwise it is unfair’
• Protest: Children protested against the other child’s behaviour (e.g., the other
child taking or trying to take rewards). Utterances were only scored as protest when
they included a negation (’No!’) or a clear request to stop (’Don’t do it!’).
Examples: Nein, ich! ’No, me’; Nicht meine nehmen! ’Don’t take mine!’; Mann, nicht!
’Man, don’t!’
A fifth coder re-scored utterances from four (29%) dyads (two female and two
male dyads) for reliability purposes. Agreement between coder 4 and coder 5 was
excellent to good for the five coding categories (ownership: Cohen’s κ = 0.934; colour:
Cohen’s κ = 0.941; allocation: Cohen’s κ = 0.708; fairness: Cohen’s κ = 1; protest:
Cohen’s κ = 0.722).
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Data analyses. Data analyses were similar to the analyses in Study 1. As
response variable, we used the number of retrieved items and not the final distribution
of items. This allowed for a fairer comparison with the apes in study 1 as only human
children, but not apes, occasionally transferred rewards to each other. Our full model
included condition as fixed effect and the control predictors of gender, dominance,
session (z-transformed to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1), and trial
(z-transformed). Model stability, confidence intervals and P-values of the fixed effects
were calculated in the same way as in study 1. The model stability test revealed that
the full model produced stable estimates. For further details, see Supplementary
Information, section 2.4.
As in Study 1 we wanted to use the estimates of the intercept to test whether the
proportion of own items obtained by a dyad differed from chance levels (0.5). However,
the intercept optimization procedure could not be performed, because the random
effects of the model were too extreme and did not allow for a reliable adjustment of the
intercept. We thus calculated the average proportion of own items retrieved by each
dyad per condition and tested the averages against chance using one-sample t-tests
(two-tailed).
Results and discussion
Comparison of the full model to a null model (without the fixed effect of
condition) revealed no significant improvement in model fit for the more complex
model, χ2(1) = 0.403, p = 0.525. Likelihood ratio tests showed that none of the fixed
effects in the full model reached significance at the 0.05 level (for details, see Table 2).
Figure 2 provides details on the proportion of own items retrieved by
four-year-olds. They retrieved an average proportion of M = 0.93 (SD = 0.12) own
items in the simultaneous condition and of M = 0.94 (SD = 0.11) own items in the
delayed condition (see Supplementary Information, Table S7, for further details). We
tested whether the proportion of own items obtained by a dyad differed from chance
levels (0.5) using t-tests (for details, see Supplementary Information). In both
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conditions, dyads retrieved their own food items significantly above chance
(simultaneous: t(13) = 13.45, p < 0.001, d = 3.60, 95% CI = [0.86, 1.00]; delayed: t(13)
= 14.65, p < 0.001, d = 3.91, 95% CI = [0.88, 1.01]). This indicates that children
reliably retrieved their own rewards and refrained from taking what belonged to their
partner.
The child with prior access monopolized food-containers in only 4% of trials in the
delayed condition and never in the simultaneous condition (see Fig. 5). Across
conditions, children wrongly retrieved one or two of their partner’s items in only 32 of
224 trials (14% of trials). In 18 trials (8% of total trials), they transferred wrongly
retrieved items back to their partner (see Supplementary Information, Table S5, for
details).
During reward retrieval, children spontaneously referred to ownership (e.g., ’This
one belongs to me’, ’That one isn’t yours’; simultaneous: 61% of on-topic utterances;
delayed: 60%; see Supplementary Information Table S6). They occasionally referred to
their assigned colours (e.g., ’You have to take the blue one’) or the reward allocation (’I
already have two’; see Supplementary Information Table S6). There was also occasional
protest (e.g., ’Don’t take mine!’) in both conditions. However, children almost never
explicitly mentioned fairness (simultaneous: 0% of on-topic utterances; delayed: 1%).
In summary, four-year-old human children recognized their own ownership and
respected other’s ownership claims following the investment of individual effort into
harvesting resources. In contrast to apes, children almost never monopolized rewards in
the delayed condition and, in the event they retrieved a wrong item (14% of trials), they
transferred it to the correct owner more than half of the time. Importantly, children in
our study referred to ownership in the majority of their on-topic utterances, but almost
never referred to fairness. In addition, children in our study worked individually to
harvest colour-marked resources and past work has found that young children divide
resources according to work effort (Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg, & Tomasello, 2011;
Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012) and based on ownership cues like colour-markings and
spatial arrangements (Ulber et al., 2015). Taken together, this suggests that
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four-year-olds’ retrieval of rewards was primarily driven by considerations for ownership
and not by considerations for fairness. Future studies could investigate whether respect
for ownership upholds when children harvest an unequal number of rewards (e.g., 1 vs.
3). Based on previous findings (Hamann et al., 2011; Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012),
we predict that German children would mostly respect what belongs to their partner in
a situation of unequal reward distribution - though it is possible that children from
societies with very strong norms of equal sharing would behave differently (Schäfer,
Haun, & Tomasello, 2015).
Discussion
We found that captive apes failed to respect their con-specific’s claim on food
resources - irrespective of whether individuals had simultaneous or delayed access. In
addition, apes with prior access (delayed condition) monopolized the resources in the
majority of trials and left none for their partner. Human children, tested with a similar
apparatus and procedure, respected their partner’s claims even when they had the
opportunity to maximize their own outcome in the delayed condition. Children were
never explicitly told about who owned the resources, but made spontaneous verbal
references to ownership during retrieval. Investment of effort into harvesting a food
resource thus induced a notion of ownership and respect thereof in human children
(Kanngiesser et al., 2010; Kanngiesser & Hood, 2014; Rochat et al., 2014), but not in
apes. These findings highlight the uniquely cooperative nature of human ownership
arrangements.
Developmental studies on respect for ownership in humans have often focused on
situations, in which ownership was already established or explicitly mentioned. For
example, toddlers and preschoolers settle conflicts about objects more often in favour of
the owner than the non-owner (Ross, 2013; Neary & Friedman, 2014) and preschoolers
are aware of their own and other’s ownership rights (Blake & Harris, 2009; Kim &
Kalish, 2009; Rossano et al., 2011) - even when the owner’s identity is not known
(Nancekivell & Friedman, 2014). There is tentative evidence that toddlers respect
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claims based on more subtle cues such as colour-markings and spatial arrangements
when sharing resources (Ulber et al., 2015). In line with previous work, we show that
pre-schoolers recognize ownership claims based on investment of effort (Kanngiesser et
al., 2010; Kanngiesser & Hood, 2014; Rochat et al., 2014) and forgo an opportunity to
steal resources harvested by others to maximize their self-gain. The investment of effort
appears to be a particularly strong cue to ownership (Davoodi et al., 2018; Kanngiesser
et al., 2010) and is recognized by young children from diverse societies (Kanngiesser,
Itakura, & Hood, 2014; Rochat et al., 2014).
Why do humans, but not other animals, have a notion of ownership? One
possibility is that, on a group level, cooperative arrangements of ownership are
dependent on third parties that (are willing to) punish those that disrespect others’
ownership (Hume, 1739/2000). Third-party-punishment of norm transgression has been
found in human adults from diverse societies (Henrich et al., 2006) and has been shown
to emerge early in human ontogeny (Rossano et al., 2011; Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013).
Chimpanzees directly punish others when they are themselves victims of a transgression
(i.e., second-party-punishment; Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2007) - to date, however,
there is no conclusive evidence of third-party-punishment in apes (von Rohr et al., 2012;
Riedl, Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2012; Schlingloff & Moore, 2018). It is possible that
apes lack the social and cognitive skills (Herrmann, Call, Hernàndez-Lloreda, Hare, &
Tomasello, 2007) to enter into and sustain cooperative ownership arrangements.
Although theoretical models of resource contests have shown that respect for
ownership can emerge, in principle, in the absence of social institutions and the (threat
of) punishment of ownership transgressions (Sherratt & Mesterton-Gibbons, 2015;
Gintis, 2007), empirical findings often cited in support of these models are inconclusive
or open to alternative explanations. (i) There is a vast literature on animal territorial
contests and the advantage of prior residency (often called prior "ownership"). However,
whether this advantage is based on an arbitrary convention of respect for prior
residency or correlated with other, non-arbitrary factors (e.g., residents being more
aggressive or larger) is debated (Kemp & Wiklund, 2004). Moreover, it has been argued
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that animals’ motives and intentions cannot be determined from the outcomes of fights
alone (Kokko et al., 2006). In fact, if prior residency was respected, no observable fights
would occur, and those fights that occurred would likely be due to intruders expecting
the resident to be absent or probing the resident’s fighting ability (Grafen, 1987). (ii)
Different primate species have been shown to avoid taking resources that are under
another’s physical control or in close proximity (Kummer, 1991; Kummer & Cords,
1991; Russ et al., 2010; Sigg & Falett, 1985). Moreover, great apes show different
possession-related behaviours such as defending their territories or valuing food they
currently possess (Brosnan, 2011; Mitani et al., 2002; Brosnan et al., 2007; Kanngiesser
et al., 2011). Importantly, none of these behaviours qualify as showing a notion of
ownership because they are all dependent on physical control or constant use of the
resources. Our study showed that once these factors were removed, apes failed to
recognize and respect others’ claims. Taken together, this casts serious doubts on claims
that humans share with other animals an evolved predisposition for ownership (Sherratt
& Mesterton-Gibbons, 2015; Stake, 2004; Gintis, 2007).
Given that the term "ownership" is used differently across disciplines (Tibble &
Carvalho, 2018), we believe that future research would benefit from differentiating
between the concept of "possession" as referring to the physical control of or close
proximity to an object and "ownership" as mutually recognized and respected norms
regulating how different agents relate to an object (irrespective of current possession).
This would increase conceptual clarity and reduce the possibility for misunderstandings
when drawing on insights from across disciplines.
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Table 1
Outputs of the reduced model predicting the proportion of own items retrieved per ape
dyad in study 1. Estimates (Est) and standard errors (SE) are shown. Confidence
intervals (CIlow/CIup) were calculated via bootstraps. P-values for fixed effects were
derived from likelihood ratio tests.
Parameter Est SE CIlow CIup χ2 Df P
Intercept -0.239 0.245 -0.811 0.411 n/a n/a n/a
Conditiona -0.085 0.233 -0.670 0.511 0.128 1 0.721
Speciesb 0.538 0.249 -0.182 1.154 4.614 1 0.032
z.Session -0.066 0.116 -0.341 0.238 0.322 1 0.571
z.Trial -0.187 0.117 -0.484 0.129 2.502 1 0.114
Owner dominancec 0.134 0.239 -0.507 0.754 0.305 1 0.581
Owner sexd -0.369 0.258 -1.011 0.291 2.006 1 0.157
Note. areference category ’delayed’; breference category ’bonobo’;
creference category ’sub-dominant’; dreference category ’female’
CHILDREN BUT NOT APES RESPECT OWNERSHIP 32
Table 2
Outputs of a model predicting the proportion of own items retrieved per child dyad in
study 2. Estimates (Est) and standard errors (SE) are shown. Confidence intervals
(CIlow/CIup) were calculated via bootstraps. P-values for fixed effects were derived from
likelihood ratio tests. Model stability is indicated by min/max values of the model
estimates.
Parameter Est SE CIlow CIup χ2 Df P Min Max
Intercept 5.964 1.294 2.978 27.436 n/a n/a n/a 5.282 9.595
Conditiona 0.351 0.557 -1.777 3.109 0.403 1 0.525 -0.334 0.767
z.Session 0.038 0.558 -1.810 1.721 0.005 1 0.946 -0.555 0.320
z.Trial -0.298 0.236 -1.095 0.418 1.586 1 0.208 -0.408 -0.165
Owner dominanceb 0.422 0.351 -0.931 2.699 1.468 1 0.226 0.290 0.587
Owner genderc -1.359 1.422 -18.466 3.010 0.952 1 0.329 -1.994 -0.367
Note. areference category ’delayed’; breference category ’non-dominant’; creference category ’fe-
male’
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Figure 1 . Experimental set-up and apparatus in Study 1. Apes were in separate rooms on
each side of the apparatus. We baited the horizontal tubes with food pellets (wrapped in
packing paper that was coloured with red or blue food dye). Apes had to harvest food items
by pushing them to the middle of the tube where they dropped onto sliding trays. Access to
the trays was blocked until the experimenters removed both grey barriers (simultaneous
condition) or one gray barrier (delayed condition).


































































































Figure 2 . The average proportion of own items (Nown.items/Nretrieved.items) retrieved per dyad
in each condition in Study 1 (bonobos, chimpanzees) and Study 2 (human four-year-olds).
The area of the circles represents the number of dyads (range: 1-8) that retrieved the
indicated average proportion. Solid black lines represent medians and grey boxes the second
and third quartile. Dotted lines represent chance level (0.5).



































Figure 3 . Percentage of trials with equal, unequal or all/none reward distribution
(irrespective of ownership) in Study 1. Light grey bars indicate equal distribution (i.e., each
individual retrieved two rewards), dark grey bars indicate unequal distribution (i.e., one
individual retrieved three rewards, the other individual one reward), and black bars indicate
all/none distribution (i.e., one individual retrieved all four rewards).
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Figure 4 . Experimental set-up and apparatus in study 2. Children were in the same room on
separate sides of the apparatus. We baited horizontal tubes with small containers containing
gummy bears. Children had to harvest the food by pushing the containers to the middle of
the tube to drop them onto sliding trays. Access to the trays was blocked until the
experimenter turned the wooden rods.


















Figure 5 . Percentage of trials with equal, unequal or all/none reward distribution
(irrespective of ownership) in Study 2. Data for retrieved rewards was used (and not the final
distribution) to ensure comparability to the ape data. Light grey bars indicate equal
distribution (i.e., each individual retrieved two rewards), dark grey bars indicate unequal
distribution (i.e., one individual retrieved three rewards, the other individual one reward), and
black bars indicate all/none distribution (i.e., one individual retrieved all four rewards).
